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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from Judge Lewis' Order denying Defendants, Tracy Cannon's
I
I
and Cannon & Associates' (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Cannons") request for attorney
fees. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Article VIII § 5 of
the Constitution of Utah; Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(j) (1996); and Rules 3
and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (2000).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
Did Judge Lewis correctly determine that Wardley's claims in this case were not
"without merit" and were not pursued in bad faith as required for an award of attorney fees
pursuant to Utah Code Anno. 78-27-56 (1996).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Cannons incorrectly identify the standard of review as a legal question that should
be reviewed for correctness. [Cannons' Brief at p. 1]. (citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305, 315 (Utah 1998) and Robertson v. Gem Ins, Co,, 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992)).
While "the without merit determination is a question of law" reviewed for correctness, Jeschke v.
Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 1991), the trial court's finding regarding "bad faith is a question
of fact and is reviewed by [the appellate courts] under the "clearly erroneous" standard." Id.
(citing Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 & n. 5 (Utah 1987); and Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989) (determination of bad faith reviewed for an abuse of
discretion)). More recently, the Utah Supreme Court noted that a "finding of bad faith is a
mixed question of law and fact that turns on a factual determination ot a party's subjective
intent." Valcarce 961 P.2d at 315-16 (citing Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah
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App.1989)). Furthermore, in the more recent case of Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d
932 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court clarified the appropriate standard of review for an
award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code. Anno. § 78-27-56 by stating that "[t]o clarify the
matter: As to whether the party lacked good faith, the trial court must make a factual finding of
a party's subjective intent. In addition, the trial court must conclude, as a matter of law, that the
action was without merit." IcL (emphasis added).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56 governs the award of attorneys fees where a
meritless case is pursued by a party in bad faith. It states:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted
in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees
against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection
(i)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
OBJECTION TO CANNONS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS
Wardley objects to the Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts as set forth
in Cannons' Brief because those sections of Cannons' Brief twist, misrepresent, confuse and
ignore the evidence and the trial court's rulings.
Examples of the objectionable and distorted representations include the following:
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(1) "Wardley's lawsuit amounted to an effort to capitalize on fraudulent and
deceptive practices." [Cannons' Brief, p. 2].
There was no such finding or determination by the trial court and no evidence to support such an
allegation was ever submitted at trial. In fact, the trial court found that "[t]he record does not
provide any credible support for a finding that Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay,
defraud or otherwise take unconscionable advantage of Cannon. [R. 1175],
(2) "At trial, the court found that Wardley [] had altered the dates of certain listing
agreements and fraudulently induced the Mascaros to enter into the listing
agreements." [Id.].
The trial court did conclude that Hansen altered an expiration date on one Listing Agreement and
inserted expiration dates to which the Mascaros did not agree on the other three Listing
Agreements which they signed. There was not, however, any finding or evidence that Wardley
altered dates or otherwise acted improperly. Furthermore, there were numerous other documents,
including options, letters, Real Estate Purchase Contracts, disclosures, and other information (95
Exhibits were marked and 65 Exhibits were received) which created numerous factual and legal
questions that were only resolved by a four day jury trial and a long period when all the evidence
was taken under advisement. [R. 847-50].
(3) "the trial court dismissed Wardley's meritless claims..." [Id.].
The trial court found that Wardley had not met its burden of proof for some of the claims it had
asserted but specifically determined that Wardley's claims had merit and were not frivolous or of
little weight or importance and they had a basis in law and/or fact. [R. 1173-74].
(4) "that Wardley, as opposed to its agent Hansen, did not act in bad faith in
bringing this action." [Id.].
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In light of all the evidence, exhibits, claims and testimony, the trial court did not find that either
Wardley or Hansen pursued their claims or presented their defense in "bad faith."
(5) "The trial court found that through its agent, Wardley took full advantage of its
opportunity to deceive the Mascaros .. . when Wardley knew that the Mascaros'
legal counsel would most likely not be present" [Cannons' Brief, p. 4].
As stated above, the trial court found some discrepancies between the dates on the listing
contracts and the Mascaro's expectations in signing them, however, only determined that this
irregularity made those contracts voidable, not void and never concluded that either Wardley or
Hansen took "full advantage to deceive the Mascaros" when their counsel was not present.
(6) "Wardley did not have any viable economic relations with the Mascaros..."
[Id].
As stated above, the trial court found that the incorrect dates on the Listing Agreements between
Wardley and the Mascaros made those contracts voidable, not void. Therefore, at some level
there were viable economic relations between Wardley and the Mascaros.
(7) "the trial court entered its order denying Cannons' Motion for attorney's fees,
ruling that Wardley was not responsible for the fraudulent conduct of its agent
because it did not participate in its agent's fraudulent conduct, did not know its
agent was engaging in fraudulent conduct, and did not have reason to know that
its agent had engaged in fraudulent conduct. [Cannons' Brief, p. 5].
While it is true that Wardley did not participate in or have actual or constructive knowledge of
any wrongful conduct, the trial court's decision that Wardley did not pursue meritless claims in
bad faith was based upon the totality of the evidence submitted in two dispositive motions and
after four days of trial testimony.
NATURE , PROCEEDINGS. FACTS AND DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW
This case was originally filed by Wardley against Defendants Leland and Sheri
Mascaro ("the Mascaros") to recover a real estate commission Wardley believed it was entitled to
-4-

because of four Listing Agreements signed by the Mascaros. [R. 12-15 and 287-90]. The
Mascaros Answered Wardley's Complaint and asserted a Counterclaim against Wardley and a
Third-Party Claim against Third-Party Defendants, Ruth and Aries Hansen ("the Hansens") who
were licensed real estate agents affiliated with Wardley. [R. 28-39]. The Mascaros1 claims
i

against Wardley and the Hansens included Negligence, Fraud, Breach of Contract, and a
Declaratory Judgment. [Id.]. Thereafter, Wardley filed an Amended Complaint asserting
additional claims against Defendant/Appellant Tracey Cannon for Unlawful Interference with
Contract, Conspiracy and Declaratory Judgment. [R. 81-90]. Tracey Cannon Answered
Wardley's Complaint but did not assert a Counterclaim against Wardley nor a Crossclaim against
the Hansens. [R. 104-09].
Tracey Cannon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging there were no
material facts which, if proven, would entitle Wardley to a judgment against her. [R. 116-33].
The trial court denied Tracey Cannon's Motion for Summary Judgment because "there [were]
material facts at issue, including what defendant, Cannon, knew or should have known and when
she obtained any knowledge she had, etc." [R. 268-70].
Wardley then received permission to and did file a Second Amended Complaint
which added Cannon Associates as a Defendant and added claims against Cannons for violation
of statutes and for conversion. [R. 277-82]. Cannons answered Wardley's Second Amended
Complaint without asserting a Counterclaim against Wardley or a Crossclaim against the
Hansens. [R. 302-09].
Wardley and the Hansens then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to
have the Mascaros' Counterclaims and Third-Party Claims dismissed. [R. 526-69]. After oral
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argument on Wardley's and Hansens' Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court dismissed
the negligence claims but found there were questions of fact regarding the Mascaros' claims for
breach of contract and for fraud. [R. 661-78].
This case was then tried before Judge Leslie Lewis for four days, from June 8-11,
1998. The following witnesses testified during presentation of Wardley's case in chief:
Aries Hansen;
Leland Mascaro;
Sheri Mascaro;
James Fairborn;
Gerard Dinkelman;
Michael Ahlin;
Ruth Mary Hansen;
Rod Foster Gordon;
Gage Froerer;
Michael Brodsky;
Rodney Butch Dailey;
Tracey Cannon;
Mitchel J. Olsen; and
Dougan Jones.
[R. 845-46, 851-52, 895 and 926-27]. Additionally, 95 Exhibits were marked, 65 of which were
received into evidence. [R. 847-50].
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At the close of Wardley's case in chief, the Mascaro's and Cannons moved for
directed verdicts. The trial court did not grant the Defendants' request, but took them under
advisement. [R. 926-27].

.

After presentation of all the evidence and closing arguments, Judge Lewis found
no cause of action against Tracey Cannon on the violation of statute or rule claims and
determined that Wardley had failed to meet its burdens of proof on its claims against Cannons for
interference with contracts or conversion. Judge Lewis, however, took Wardley's claims against
Mascaro's and Cannons related to the listing contracts under advisement. [R. 927 and 937-38].
The trial court kept the pending claims under advisement for 68 days and on
August 28, 1998, issued a Memorandum Decision which concluded that the Listing Contracts
signed by the Mascaros were voidable and unenforceable because they did not accurately reflect
the Mascaros' understanding that they would only be one day listings. [R. 945-51]. Consequently,
Wardley's claim against Cannons also failed. The trial court also ruled that the Mascaros were
not entitled to recover any amount from Wardley or the Hansens on their Counterclaims and
Third-Party Claims for breach of contract and fraud. [R. 951-53].
Thereafter, the Mascaros and Cannons' requested attorney fees pursuant to Utah
Code Anno. § 78-27-56. [R. 972-78 and 979-1080]. After the issue was fully briefed [R. 10911111, 1121-23 and 1154-61]. Judge Lewis Ruled that the Mascaros and Cannons were not
entitled to attorney fees pursuant to § 78-27-56 because the Court could not conclude that
"Wardley's suit was without merit" [R. 1173]. and "was not asserted or pursued with the requisite
bad faith." [R. 1174-75]. Judge Lewis specifically found that the Defendants "failed to show that
Wardley's claims under the listing agreements were frivolous or of little weight or importance
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having no basis in law or fact." [R. 1173-74 (citing Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1983)). The trial court supported that conclusion by noting "that the listing agreements entered
into between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because of Mr. Hansen's misconduct,
[but] the legality of the listing agreements, a mixed fact and legal question, was not entirely
clear." [Id.]. The trial court went on to explain that its decision was reached "only after
extensively evaluating the trial testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous documents
entered into evidence, in light of the law." [Id.].
Judge Lewis' Ruling regarding Wardley's lack of bad faith in pursuing its claims
states "[the record does not provide any credible support for a finding that Wardley pursued its
claims to hinder, delay, defraud, or otherwise take unconscionable advantage of Cannon or the
Mascaros" and that it would not be equitatble to award the Defendants their attorney fees from
Wardley. [R. 1175].
Cannons appealed the trial court's denial of their request for attorney fees pursuant
to Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court order complained of by Cannons involves both legal and factual
questions. In order to overturn a trial court's factual determinations an appellant must marshal all
the evidence which supports the determination to demonstrate it cannot stand. In this case,
however, Cannons did not include any portion of the four days of trial testimony or any of the 65
exhibits admitted at the trial of this case. Cannons' failure to marshal should lead this Court to
affirm the trial court's findings.
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The trial court's determinations that Wardley's claims were meritorious and were
not pursued in bad faith are supported by the facts, evidence and the record and should not be
overturned on appeal.
Wardley should not be punished for the wrongful conduct it did not know about,
did not ratify or support in some way. The appropriate party, if any, that should have been
responsible for Cannons' attorney fees is Hansen. Nevertheless, Cannons' failure to file claims
against him preclude them from recovery in this case.
The trial court found, and set forth in the record, several factors which justify its
decision not to award Cannons' attorney fees against Wardley. Those factors include the
complexity of the facts and legal issues, Wardley's lack of knowledge of wrongdoing, its lack of
participation in any wrongdoing and its honest good faith belief in the claims it was pursuing.
ARGUMENT
I.

CANNONS' FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS FATAL TO
THEIR APPEAL
In order to challenge the finding of a trial court, the appellant must "marshal the

evidence, citing the appellate court to all the evidence in the record that would support the
determination reached by the trial court and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light
most favorable to the court below, it is insufficient to support the finding under attack. Interiors
Contracting, Inc. v. Smith Halander & Smith Assoc, 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1994) (citing
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,116 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); West Valley City v. Majestic
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991); Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah
App.1990); and Harker v. Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah
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App. 1987)). "In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley, 818 P.2d
at 1315.
In this case Cannons appeal the trial court's denial of their request for attorney
fees which was based upon the determination that Wardley had not pursued a meritless claim in
bad faith.1 Whether a claim is without merit is a question of law which this Court should review
for correctness. Whether or not a claim is pursued in bad faith, however, is a "question of fact
and is reviewed by [the appellate] court under the clearly erroneous standard. Jeschke, 811 P.2d
at 204. "The party challenging the trial court's findings of fact 'must show that the evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court, is legally insufficient to support the contested
finding.'" Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Dep't ofSoc.
Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah App.1991)). In order to prevail in this Appeal,
Cannons needed to marshal all the evidence which supports the trial court's decision that
Wardley's claims were meritorious and not pursued in bad faith, then show how that the finding
is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Cannons, however, have
not marshaled any evidence supporting the trial court's decision.
This dispute involved several dispositive motions, sixty five exhibits and four
days of trial testimony. Even then, the trial court needed a significant amount of time to sort
through all of the evidence before it could make a ruling. Rather than provide this Court with the
trial testimony or the exhibits upon which the trial court's decision was based, Cannons have
1

The basis for finding a claim meritless and the standard to determine whether an action
is pursued in bad faith are dealt with separately below.
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relied only upon the trial court's finding that Hansen inserted dates on four listing agreements that
were inconsistent with the Mascaro's understanding. Cannons failed to point out the various Real
Estate Purchase Contracts that the Hansens presented to the Mascaros. [R. 847-50]. They
ignored the fact that the Mascaros believed they had a contract with Wardley or they would not
have filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract. [R. 28-39]. They also disregarded the
numerous other efforts and steps which the Hansens took to help the Mascaros sell their property.
[R. 661-77]. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Cannons did not provide this Court with any
of the trial testimony, which formulated the basis for the trial court's decision. [R. 1409-11;
Notice of No Transcript Requested].
"If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." Saunders v. Sharp,
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). After carefully considering all the evidence presented in this
case the trial court determined that the claims pursued by Wardley had merit "they were not
frivilous or of little weight or significance" and were not pursued in bad faith. [R. 1171-77 and
1265-67]. "If the party challenging the finding fails to marshal the supporting evidence, the trial
court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Utah
App. 1995); (citing Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah App.1991)). Because Cannons
have not marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, this Court should assume
that the record supports the trial court and uphold the decision denying Cannons the attorney fees
requested.
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II.

CANNONS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES FROM
WARDLEY BECAUSE ITS CLAIMS WERE MERITORIOUS AND
WERE NOT PURSUED IN BAD FAITH
In order to award attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56 three

requirements must be met: "(1) the party seeking fees prevailed; (2) the claim or defense asserted
by the opposing party was meritless; and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in bad faith."
Chipman, 934 P.2d at 1161. In order to prove a claim is without merit, a party must show that
the claim is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady,
671 P.2d at 151. The instant case involved complex factual and legal issues, including the
alleged modification of the Listing Agreements, the enforceability of the Listing Agreements,
whether Cannons interfered with another buyer's purchase of the property, whether the Mascaros
refused to sell their property to a ready, willing and able buyer brought into the transaction by
Wardley, and whether Cannons interfered with the Wardley/Mascaro Listing Agreement. [R.
268-70, 271-92, 636 and 661-77]. Reviewing all of the evidence, the trial court did not conclude
that Wardleys claims were "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in law
or fact." [R. 1173-74 (citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151)]. The legality of the Listing Agreements
upon which Wardleys claims were based, presented mixed questions of fact and law which were
only resolved by the trial court after "extensively evaluating the trial testimony and carefully
scrutinizing the numerous documents entered into evidence, in light of the law." [Id]. Even
without the benefit of the trial testimony and numerous documents upon which the trial court's
decision was based the meritorious nature of Wardley's claims is obvious and should be
recognized by this Court.
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Even if Wardle^s claims lack merit, before attorney fees can be awarded pursuant
to Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56,, there must be a factual finding that Wardley did not have a
good faith belief in its claims. "Finding a lack of good faith turns on subjective intent" and for
purposes of § 78-27-56 is synonymous with a finding of "bad faith." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151-52.
See also Taylor, 770 P.2d at 171 and Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315-16. To find that Wardley acted
in "bad faith" by pursuing these claims "the trial court must find that one or more of the
following factors existed: (I) the party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in
question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) the party
intended to or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or
defraud others." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 316 (citing Cady, 671 P.2d at 151). There was no
evidence presented below, and none before this Court, that Wardley lacked an honest belief in
the propriety of its claims, that it intended to take unconscionable advantage of anyone or that it
knew its actions would hinder, delay or defraud others. To the contrary, the trial court found that
even though Hansen had improperly modified/inserted dates on the Listing Agreements, when all
the evidence was considered, Wardley had a good faith basis from which to pursue the claims
involved in this action. This Court, therefore, should affirm the trial court's decision denying
Cannons' request for attorney fees.
In the Cady case, like in this case, a realty company sued for a commission from a
prospective seller of real property. The trial court in that case found that the realtor's claims were
meritless and awarded the defendant its attorney fees. The Utah Supreme Court, however,
reversed and held that even though the suit may have been ill conceived and without merit, there
was no proof of bad faith to support an award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court explained:
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[i]n the instant case, the trial court found lack of good faith because
had plaintiffs researched the issue as instructed at pre-trial
conference, they would have discovered they had no valid claim
and they could have saved the court valuable time by avoiding trial.
We disagree that this conduct constitutes bad faith. Plaintiffs were
clearly pursuing a meritless claim and better preparation might well
have disclosed that to them. However, that conduct does not rise
to lack of good faith. The evidence must also affirmatively
establish a lack of at least one of the three elements of good faith
heretofore discussed. There was no evidence that plaintiffs lacked
an honest (although ill-formed) belief in their claim; that they had
an intent to take an unconscionable advantage of defendants; nor
that they had the intent to, or knowledge that their suit would
hinder, delay or defraud defendants.
Cady9 671 P.2d at 152; (citing Tacoma Assoc, of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 458, 433
P.2d 901, 904 (1967). Even if Wardley's claims were poorly researched and/or ill-formed, the
honest belief that a commission was due from the Mascaros and or Cannons defeats Cannons1
claim for attorney fees in this case.
III.

CANNONS 1 RELIANCE UPON PRINCIPLES OF VICARIOUS
LIABILITY ARE MISPLACED AND WERE NOT A PART OF THE
PROCEEDING BELOW
The doctrine of vicarious liability by which employers and principals are held

liable for the harmful conduct of their employees and agents committed within the coarse and
scope of their employment provides a basis for tort liability. It does not automatically apply in all
circumstances. For example, an employer will only be held responsible for punitive damages
resulting from an employee's conduct in Ihe following four circumstances:
(a) if the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of
the act;
(b) if the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in
employing or retaining him;
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(c) if the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope
of employment; or
(d) if the principal or a managerial agent of the principal knowingly ratified or
approved the act.
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co. , 811 P.2d 151, 63 (Utah 1991); (citing Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 217C (1958)). The award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Anno § 78-27-56 is
much closer to an award of punitive damages than to an award for tortious conduct. Recovery of
attorney fees under § 78-27-56 is punitive rather than remunerative and is only available when a
party acts so far outside the bounds of acceptable conduct that a sanction would be appropriate.
Even if the single factual finding that Hansen placed incorrect dates upon the Listing Agreement,
equates to a meritless action being filed in bad faith, the wrongdoer, in this case, Hansen, should
be the one held responsible,
Cannons may complain that they cannot collect from Hansen. Cannons' inability
to collect from Hansen, however, is entirely their own fault for not filing a crossclaim against
Hansen like the Mascaros did. If Cannons had asserted a claim against Hansen, recovery of
awardable fees would be possible. Wardley should not be forced to answer for Cannons' failure
to avail themselves of relevant legal remedies.
IV.

EVEN IF WARDLEY IS DETERMINED TO BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR HANSEN'S CONDUCT THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED
THAT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES
COUPLED WITH HANSEN'S WRONGFUL CONDUCT
PRECLUDED AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN THIS CASE
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56 provides for the award of attorney fees to the

prevailing party when the opposing party has pursued a meritless action which was not brought
or asserted in good faith. Subsection 2 of that code section, however, states that the "court, in its
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discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under subsection (1), but only if the
court: ...(b) enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under provisions of Subsection
(1)." Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56(2). hi the instant case the trial court entered findings which
justify not awarding any fees against Wardley in this case. Those findings included:
1.

Wardley's suit was not without merit; [R. 1173].

2.

The evidence did not support the contention that Wardley's claims were
frivolous of little weight; [R. 1173-74].

3.

Wardley did not have knowledge of Hansen's fraudulent conduct; [R.
1174].

4.

Wardley strongly believed it had a claim for unpaid commissions; [Id.].

5.

Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing agreements, which
on their face appeared to be legitimate, cannot be viewed with 20/20
hindsight and the benefit of approximately four days of trial testimony;
[Id]-

6.

Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith; [Id], and

7.

The record does not provide any credible support for a finding that
Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud or otherwise take
unconscionable advantage of Cannon. [R. 1175].

See also &• 1265-67.
Wardley has already expended a significant amount on attorney fees as a result of
Hansen's conduct. In the interests of justice and for the reasons set forth above this Court should
determine that even if Wardley is somehow responsible for Hansen's conduct, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by not awarding the attorney fees requested by Cannons.

CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF
Cannons' appeal should be denied and the lower court ruling upheld because
Cannons failed to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's decisions. Additionally,
-16-

this Court should affirm the trial court's decision that Wardle/s claims were meritorious and not
pursued in bad faith. Alternatively this Court should hold that Wardley is not responsible
pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior to pay for Cannons' attorney fees resulting from
Hansen's conduct that it did not know about or ratify. Finally, this Court should affirm the trial
court's decision and findings that the facts of this case and justice compel the decision that
Wardley should not be required to pay Cannons1 attorney fees in this case.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29, Utah R. App. P. Wardley hereby requests oral argument on
this Appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^> day of August, 2000.
SCALLEY & READING, P.C
Attorneys for Appellee/Wardley

Steven B. Smith
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
day of August, 2000, two true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were deposited in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage
prepaid, addressed to the following:
Mark O. Morris
David N Wolf
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John Bucher
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

-17-

James C. Haskins
357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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This case came before the Court for hearing on November 5,
1997/ on the Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Counterclaims and
Third-Party Complaint. The Court heard argument and ruled from the
bench that summary judgment was granted as to the defendants' and
counterclaimant's (Mascaros') negligence claim.

The remainder of

the Motion for Summary Judgment was taken under advisement.

The

Court, having now reviewed the plaintiff's Motion and the Mascaros'
Memorandum in Opposition and having heard and reflected upon the
law and argument from counsel, rules as stated herein.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied for reasons
more fully articulated in this Ruling.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In their Third Party Complaint and Counterclaim, the Mascaros
allege that plaintiff Wardley Better Homes and Gardens, through
third-party

defendants Ruth and Aries Hansen, contacted them

concerning the sale of property that they owned ("the Property').
It appears that the Hansens were real estate agents representing
either Wetcor Development or Michael Ahlin, the potential buyer of
the Property.

(Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint at para.

55) .
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On November 14, 1993, the Mascaros and Wardley Better Homes
and Gardens entered into four agreements, each entitled "Listing
Agreement

&

Agency

Disclosure".

All

four

agreements

are

collectively referred to as "the listing agreements".
The first listing agreement covered 40 acres of the Property
and was presented to the Mascaros at the same time as Wetcor
Development's offer to purchase the Property, which came in the
form of a Real Estate Purchase Agreement. (Counterclaim and Third
Party Complaint at para. 60). The remaining three agreements were
presented to the Mascaros at the same time as an offer to enter
into an option agreement.
corresponded
agreement.

in price

The terms of these listing agreements

and

acreage

with

the proposed

option

While the described property varied, the remaining

terms and conditions in the listing agreements were the same. See
Listing Agreements.
The Mascaros claim that the Hansens did not represent or
disclose to them that the listing agreements were exclusive or for
a term of more than one day or that it covered sales to any buyer
of the property other than Wetcor Development or Michael Ahlm.
(Counterclaim

at para.

62) . The Mascaros

signed the listing

agreements and accepted both the Real Estate Purchase Agreement and
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The buyer of the Property subsequently assigned his

purchase and option agreements with the Mascaros. The closing date
of May 15, 1994, passed with neither the buyer nor its assignee
closing on the first 40 acres of the Property.
On May 19, 1994, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the
Hansens advised the Mascaros that another buyer had been located
and that this buyer's offer on the Property would be presented.
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens claims that the Mascaros instead
conveyed the Property to a third-party purchaser, defendant Tracey
Cannon.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Standard

of

RBViev

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court
evaluates

the

evidence

and

all

reasonable

inferences

drawn

therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.

B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99, 101

(Utah App. 1988).

Additionally, the Court recognizes that "summary

judgment is appropriate only where there are no issues of genuine
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."

Gold Standard, Inc. V, Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1063

(Utah 1996).

Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that the law is
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well-settled that in a motion for summary judgment, a trial court's
analysis does not involve weighing any disputed evidence. A trial
court's only inquiry should be whether material issues of fact
exist.

Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100

(Utah 1995) citing W.M. Barnes Co. V. Sohio Nat'1 Resources Co.,
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981)).

1.
Plaintiff
and Third-Party
Defendant's
Motion for Summary
Judgment concerning the breach of contract claim is denied.
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Wardley Better Homes and
Gardens and the Hansens argue that the Mascaro's claim of breach of
contract must

fail

as

a matter

of

law because

the

listing

agreements did not require them to ascertain whether a potential
buyer would be able to perform its obligations in closing on the
sale transaction. The Mascaros respond in their Memorandum in
Opposition that Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens
breached the listing agreements by not presenting a ready, willing
and able buyer.
The Court finds that the Mascaros' analysis confuses Wardley
Better Homes and Gardens' and the Hansens' contractual obligations
to not only procure a buyer who was ready, willing and able, but
also to evaluate the financial stability of the buyer, advise the
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Mascaros on the technicalities of a 1031 exchange, and coordinate
the

potential

contingencies.

buyer's

actions

in

satisfying

the

closing

The Court finds that absent a contractual provision

to the contrary, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens
were not insurers of the potential buyer's subsequent performance
of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement.

See e.g. F.M.A. Financial

Corp. v. Building, Inc., 404 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1965) (broker
cannot be held as insurer against the possibility that the buyer
may become dissatisfied with his bargain and bring a lawsuit
claiming the right of recision).

Once Wardley Better Homes and

Gardens and the Hansens met their obligations under the listing
agreements in procuring a potential buyer who, at that time, was
apparently ready, willing and able, it is irrelevant to the breach
of contract claim that the potential buyer or its assignee refused
or were unable to close on the Property.

Accordingly, the Court

determines that the Mascaros could not prevail as a matter of law
on their breach of contract claim if their position was solely that
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens failed to procure
a ready, willing and able buyer because the buyer that they did
procure was not financially able to close on the Property.
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However, the Mascaros appear to have an alternative argument
that Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens breached
paragraph 10 of the listing agreements by neglecting to list the
Property through the Multiple Listing Service.

The Court and

opposing counsel first learned of this position during the course
of oral argument, at which time the Mascaros' counsel indicated to
the Court that deposition testimony had recently been adduced that
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens never listed the
Property through the Multiple Listing Service-

The testimony

alluded to by the Mascaros' counsel would clearly constitute a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the breach of
contract claim.

However, counsel never presented a transcript of

the deposition testimony or excerpts of the same to the Court.
Thus, the Court is left in the difficult position of having to rule
solely on the representations of counsel, as an officer of the
court, that such testimony was indeed adduced.

While it is not

desirable to raise issues in this manner, it appears nonetheless
that the issue does exist and the facts relating to it are in
dispute.

In its discretion, the Court concludes that the Mascaros

are not foreclosed, as a matter of law, from asserting a breach of
contract claim.
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2.
Plaintiff
and Third-Party
Defendants'
Judgment concerning the fraud and declaratory

Motion for $ymm$ry
judgment claims are

Cieniec?.
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens and the Hansens claim that
the Mascaros failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Rules of Civil Procedure does specify that

Rule 9(b) of the Utah
xx

[i]n all averments of

fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity."

Fraud requires that a false

representation of an existing material fact must be made knowingly
or recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon, and
there must be reasonable reliance resulting in the plaintiff's
injury. Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984); Duaan v.
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980) . The Utah Supreme Court has
historically held, and continues to stress, that mere conclusory
allegations in a pleading unsupported by a recitation of relevant
surrounding

facts, are insufficient

summary judgment.

to preclude dismissal or

See Norton v.* Blackham, 669 P.2d 857. 859 (Utah

1983); Ellefsen v. Roberts, 526 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1974).
In this case, however, the fraud claim set forth in the
Mascaros' Counterclaim

and Third Party Complaint

incorporates

averments that the Hansens, as agents of Wardley Better Homes and
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Gardens, made misrepresentations concerning (1) the duration and
scope of the listing agreements; (2) their expertise in structuring
real estate transactions to qualify under §1031/ and

(3) the

exercise of the option to be contingent on the closing of the first
40 acres of the Property.

Furthermore, they allege that the

misrepresentations were made with the intent of inducing them to
rely

on

the

agreements.

representations

by

entering

into

the

listing

The Mascaros claim that they did in fact rely on these

misrepresentations to their detriment because of the ultimate delay
in the sale of the Property, their inability to collect earnest
money deposit of $4,000 made by the potential buyer, and incurring
attorney's fees and costs in dealing with the potential buyer.
This is a sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts
underlying the Mascaros' claim of fraud to support this Court's
conclusion that the requirement of Rule 9(b) has been met.

The

Court therefore denies summary judgment as to both the fraud and
the declaratory judgment claim.
Accordingly, Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied for the foregoing reasons and counsel
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for the Mascaros is to prepare an Order consistent with this

Ruling.
Dated t h i s

sfKs

'X

/ <^~~day o f December,

1

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this
.day of December, 1997:

Neil R. Sabin
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Steven W. Dougherty
Attorney for Defendant Mascaro
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Mark 0. Morris
Attorney for Defendant Cannon
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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THE COURT:

I am going to take under

advisement the plaintiff's claim against the Mascaros. I
want to review all of the documents and I will write a
formal ruling with reference to my determination.

I want

to do it while the facts are fresh in my mind so will do
that relatively quickly.
As to Ms. Cannon, the Court finds no cause as
to the claim of statutory violation.

The Court finds

that she did nothing improper ethically.

In arriving at

that determination and finding, I have relied heavily
upon the totality of facts and circumstances and the
credibility of the witnesses.
I found Ms. Cannon herself to be credible in
terms of explaining what had transpired, her responses to
the same.

I also found Mr. Butch Bailey to be a

compelling witness on this point.
With reference to the various claims against
her, I find that there is no showing and plaintiff has
not met its burden of proof in connection with the
alleged contract interference, vis-a-vis, the Ahlin
WetCor deal, the old Brodsky deal and the Bolin deal.
As to the board listing agreement with the
Mascaros, that is the one thing I'm taking under
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advisement with reference to Ms. Cannon, finding that the
plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof with
reference to Ms. Cannon on conversion and finding that
they have not met their burden of proof as I've
previously indicated on the alleged statutory violation.
I cannot find that there has been any showing
of impropriety in terms of how she's handled this of an
ethical nature.
I will make a ruling with reference to the
remaining issues as quickly as I can.

I will indicate to

Counsel that I have another trial, a jury trial, set to
begin on Monday and hearings in connection with that
tomorrow and I have a criminal trial the following week,
but my plan would be to get to this as quickly as I can.
I would like to say to all of the attorneys
involved, all seven of you, that it has been a distinct
privilege and pleasure to have you all here.

I have

found that all of you have shown that you have engaged in
the highest degree of professionalism and preparedness
throughout.

There has not been one time during this

trial when counsel has not had available the appropriate
documents, even in a case which, as Mr. Sabin so well
pointed out, has been document intensive.
And each one of you were well prepared to move
forward on these issues and the degree of professionalism
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, :

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 940907000

Plaintiff,
vs.
LELAND J. MASCARO, et al.,

:

Defendants.
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES £. GARDENS, :
Counterdefendant.
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Third Party Plainttiffs,

:

vs.
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES HANSEN,
Third Party Defendants.

:

This case came before the Court for trial beginning on June 8,
1998, and continuing through June 11, 1998.

The Court having
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received testimony and heard argument from counsel, ruled from the
bench that the plaintiffs had not established a cause of action
against defendant Tracy Cannon with respect to their claim that
defendant Tracy Cannon's conduct violated the Utah Administrative
Code.

Specifically, the Court found that defendant Tracy Cannon's

conduct was not unprofessional or unethical under the totality of
the facts and circumstances and based upon the testimony of certain
witnesses, including defendant Tracy Cannon and Rodney "Butch"
Dailey, whom the Court found to be credible • The Court also ruled
that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof in connection
with

their

claim

that

defendant

Tracy

Cannon

intentionally

interfered with the plaintiff's prospective economic relations with
respect

to

the

Wetcor/Michael

Ahlin

deal,

the

Michael

Brodsky/Hamlet Development deal and the Boulder deal (see factual
discussion below).

Further, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs

had not met their burden of proof as to their claim that defendant
Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the
defendant
conversion.

Mascaros'

property

to

the

plaintiff

constituted

The remaining issues raised in the Second Amended

Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Third Party Complaint were
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taken under advisement by the Court for further, more in-depth
consideration,

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This Court finds that credible testimony adduced at trial,
establishes

the following

facts.

The Mascaros

("Mascaros")

defendants and third-party plaintiffs, were first contacted by
third-party defendant Aries Hansen ("Mr. Hansen") in the summer of
1993.

Mr. Hansen, who represented himself to be the agent of the

plaintiff and counterdefendant Wardley Better Homes & Gardens
("Wardley"), inquired whether the Mascaros were interested inselling approximately 128 acres of real property which is the
subject of this lawsuit. Mr. Hansen informed the Mascaros that he
was looking for property in that area for Michael L. Ahlin ("Mr.
Ahlin"), President of Impact Development Corporation d/b/a Wetcor.
After his initial meeting with the Mascaros, Mr. Hansen met
with defendant and third-party plaintiff Sheri Mascaro

("Mrs.

Mascaro") and requested that she sign an Option agreement. Mrs.
Mascaro signed, but did not date, the Option agreement (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1). The terms of this Option agreement included a 20 day
duration and gave Mr. Hansen, and his wife, third-party defendant
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Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen"), or their assigns, the right to
purchase the Mascaros' property.
When Mr. Hansen discovered that defendant and third-party
plaintiff Leland Mascaro ("Mr. Mascaro") was the actual owner of
the property, he asked the Mascaros to sign a second Option
agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

The terms of the second Option

agreement, dated September 14, 1993, were identical to the first
Option agreement and was signed by both the Mascaros. According to
the trial testimony, it was also on this date that Mrs. Mascaro
informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West Inc. ("Century 21")
had an exclusive listing agreement on the property.

The Century 21

listing agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30) had been signed by Mr.
Mascaro on May 28, 1993, and provided for a six month duration.
The Court found Mr. Hansen's testimony that he was not aware of the
Century 21 agreement was lacking in credibility.

To the contrary,

the Court finds that the Century 21 agreement was disclosed to Mr.
Hansen and that he requested Mrs. Mascaro to obtain a one-party
exemption from Mr. Jerard Dinkelman, the principal broker under the
Century

21 Agreement.

Mrs. Mascaro

obtained

the exemption

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29) on September 14, 1993. This exemption was
acquired before the second Option agreement was executed.
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It further appears from the testimony that when Mr. Ahlin did
not make an immediate offer, Mr. Hansen engaged in other actions
with

the

Mascaros,

including

having

them

write

a

letter

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), dated October 6, 1993, to put pressure on
Mr. Ahlin to make the deal.

Mrs. Mascaro conceded at trial that

this letter, stating that she and her husband had been contacted by
another developer offering ernest money on the parcels, was a
fabrication.
On October 12, 1993, Mr. Ahlin made an offer on the property
through a Real Estate Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) of
the same date.

In addition to the Real Estate Purchase Contract,

Mr. Hansen prepared a Dual Agency Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4)
which was signed by Mr. Ahlin and Mrs. Hansen.

The Court finds

this Agreement is significant because Mr. Hansen had continuously
represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively.
In addition, Mr. Rod Gordon testified that he was Mr. Ahlin's agent
and that it was inappropriate for the Hansens to present a Dual
Agency Agreement for Mr. Ahlin's consideration and signature. Also
of significance is the Sales Agency Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit
4) which the Hansens prepared for the Mascaros' signature. A handwritten notation on the top of this contract expressly states that

00941

WARDLEY V. MASCARO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE SIX

it is a single party listing and that the single party is Wetcor.
All of these documents were sent to the Mascaros and to their legal
counsel, Mr. Mitch Olsen. Mr. Olsen testified that he advised the
Mascaros not to sign the documents and offered to draft an original
real

estate purchase contract which included a provision for

commission to be paid to the Hansens in the event that Mr. Ahlin
consummated the purchase of the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16).
Based on Mr. Olsen's advice, the Mascaros did not act on Mr.
Ahlin's offer but continued to negotiate with him.

In addition,

the testimony is clear that no listing agreement was ever executed
or contemplated by the Mascaros at that time.
On November 14, 1993, Mr. Hansen came to the Mascaros' home
with a number of documents. At this meeting, Mr. Hansen brought an
Option

Agreement

(Defendant's

Exhibit

89), a Limited Agency

Disclosure Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), a blank Real Estate
Purchase

Contract

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), and

four listing

agreements ("Listing Agreements") with Salt Lake Board of Realtors
Land Data Input Forms (Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 - 20).
testimony,

Mr.

Hansen

acknowledged

that

in

In his

preparing

documents the night before, he had predated many of them.

these
The

Court finds that Mr. Hansen's preparation of these documents was
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unsolicited and that Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros on
a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel.

It appears

to the Court that Mr. Hansen's urgency in preparing these documents
and having the Mascaros sign them was based on the expiration of
the second Option agreement.

It further appears from the Mascaros'

testimony that Mr. Hansen's scheme was to have the Mascaros present
an offer to Mr. Ahlin with the expectation that he would purchase
a small portion of the acreage and agree to an option on the
remainder of the land.

However, because the Mascaros and Mr.

Hansen did not yet know how many acres Mr. Ahlin would actually be
willing to purchase, the principle terms of the Real Estate
Purchase Contract were left blank.

In addition, only the first of

the four Listing Agreements contained an expiration date.
The Court finds that the first Listing Agreement (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 17A), in its unaltered state, reflects the actual agreement
between the Mascaros and Mr. Hansen.

This Listing Agreement was

set to expire on November 15, 1993, one day after Mr. Hansen's
Sunday meeting with the Mascaros.

The Court finds that Mr. Hansen

altered the date on this Listing Agreement from November 15, 1993
to November 15, 1994.

This finding is based on the credible

testimony of the Mascaros and the Court's comparison of documents
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where changes are initialed (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), with the
Listing Agreement marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17A, where the
change in the expiration date has no initials.

The Court further

finds that with respect to the other three Listing Agreements,
which were blank with respect to the expiration dates, these were
filled in by

Mr. Hansen, subsequent to the Mascaros' signature,

with "November 14, 1994" dates. The credible testimony established
that Mr. Hansen's

conduct

in changing and/or writing in the

expiration dates, was engaged in without the knowledge and the
approval of the Mascaros.

In addition, the dates alluded to and

written by Mr. Hansen were contrary to the parties' agreement and
clear understanding that the Listing Agreements would expire in one
day.
This Court also finds that Mr. Ahlin did subsequently sign
both the Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract,
and Mrs. Hansen accepted

an earnest money check for $4,000.

Further, it is clear that the deal between the Mascaros and Mr.
Ahlin subsequently failed.

After an attempt to arbitrate the

matter of the earnest money, the title company released the $4,000
earnest money to Mr. Ahlin's assignees.
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This Court also finds that around this same time, another
potential purchaser of the property, Michael Brodsky, President of
Hamlet Development, began to negotiate with the Mascaros.

Mr.

Brodsky testified that he proposed purchasing the property in
stages and thought that he and the Mascaros had reached a verbal
agreement

on

the

sale.

, However, before

the

agreement was

finalized, Mr. Brodsky was informed by the Mascaros that a sale of
the property had occurred.
signed

a

Associates.

one

year

listing

In

September

agreement

1994,

with

the

Mascaros

defendant

Cannon

In October 1994, the Mascaros signed a Real Estate

Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the property to defendant
Tracey Cannon ("Ms. Cannon").

The Mascaros and Ms. Cannon closed

on this property on May 11, 1995. Ms. Cannon received a commission
from the sale of $115,338.16.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Court determines
that the listingagreem^ntfr entered
into
between
Wardley and the Mascaros
are roicfofrlg
because they were secured by fraud in the
inducement.
In its Second Amended Complaint, Wardley claims that the
Mascaros have breached their Listing Agreements with Wardley by
refusing to pay Wardley the 7% commission provided for in the
Listing Agreements upon the sale of the property to Ms. Cannon.
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Wardley argues that the sale to Ms. Cannon was entered into within
the one-year term of the Listing Agreements. According to Wardley,
when the sale on the property to Ms. Cannon closed, the contractual
requirements for Wardley's earned commission had been satisfied.
In their Counterclaim

and Third Party Complaint

against

Wardley and the Hansens, the Mascaros contend they were induced to
sign the Listing Agreements in reliance on false representations
made to them by Mr. Hansen.

The representations which the Mascaros

claim were fraudulent are:

(1) that Mr. Hansen told them that he

would only receive a commission for the sale of the Mascaros'
property to Wetcor if they signed the Listing Agreements and (2)
that the Listing Agreements would be valid for only one day and
would apply only to the Wetcor purchase.

The Mascaros also claim

that Wardley breached its contract with them by failing to list the
property on the MLS, and by failing to appropriately market the
property.
Under Utah law, a person may rely upon positive assertions
made by another, Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980),
and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid
the contract.

Berkely Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d
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The nine essential elements of fraudulent

inducement (fraud) are:
"(1) that a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact;
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient
knowledge
upon
which
to
base
such
representation;
(5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act
(9) to his injury and damage."
Meibos, 607 P.2d at 800.
The Court determines that the Mascaros have proven fraudulent
inducement because they have presented evidence supporting all of
its elements.

This Court finds most significant the fact that

there are inconsistencies between the written terms of the Listing
Agreements and the Mascaros' expressed intention to limit Mr.
Hansen's representation to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and to limit the
duration of his representation to one day.

These inconsistencies

can only be reconciled with a finding that Mr. Hansen fraudulently
represented that the Listing Agreements would be limited to oneparty and would expire in one day to induce the Mascaros to sign
the Listing Agreements.

As part of his fraudulent scheme, the
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Court finds that Mr. Hansen altered the November 15, 1993, date
which was originally found on the first Listing Agreement and added
expiration dates to the remaining three Listing Agreements to
reflect an unagreed and unintended one-year duration.
Mr.

Hansen

unilaterally

modified

the

Listing

It appears

Agreements

to

improperly expand the scope of his representation beyond that
contemplated by the Mascaros.

The Court finds that Mr. Hansen's

modifications were made without the Mascaros' knowledge and at a
time when they did not have counsel available on the benefit of
necessary legal advice.

Based on the Mascaros' testimony, which

the Court found to be credible, they were induced into signing
incomplete

drafts

of the Listing Agreements

during

a Sunday

meeting, when their legal counsel was apparently unavailable,
because of Mr. Hansen's representation that it was the only way for
him to receive a commission on the deal and his assurances that the
final

version

limitations

of

the

Listing

they had discussed.

Agreements

would

contain

the

In addition, the Mascaros'

testified that they failed to take any additional precautions such
as filling out the blank spaces because of their belief that Mr.
Hansen had their best interests in mind.

On this topic, the Court

found Mrs. Mascaro's statement that "blind trust walked in and care
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walked out" to be a particularly compelling statement concerning
the Mascaros' reliance upon Mr, Hansen's representations and the
opportunity for deception by Mr. Hansen.

The Court finds that Mr.

Hansen took full advantage of this opportunity by arriving for a
hastily scheduled meeting with the Mascaros, whom Mr. Hansen knew
to be represented by legal counsel, on a Sunday, when counsel would
be unlikely to be available.
Overall, the Court found that the Mascaros' belief that they
were operating under a one-day, one-party listing agreement was
corroborated by documents received into evidence and the totality
of credible trial testimony.
Contract

For instance, the Sale Agency

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) presented to the Mascaros and

signed by Mrs. Hansen imparts the Hansens' acknowledgment of the
Mascaros' expressed intention to limit the Hansens' listing to "a
single party listing . . . The single party is Wetcor."

Further,

the Court finds that Mr. Hansen was aware of the Century 21 Listing
and was fully cognizant he could represent the Mascaros only if he
could obtain a one-party exemption. Mr. Hansen's request that Mrs.
Mascaro obtain a one-party exemption from Century 21 is congruent
with

the

Mascaros'

express

reservations

that

their

listing

agreement with the Hansens be limited to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and
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with the Hansens' recognition that their representation had to be
limited to one-party so as not run afoul of the Century 21 Listing.
Next, it is significant to the Court that the change in the
expiration date on the first Listing Agreement was not initialed.
When compared to other documents where changes were initialed by
the Mascaros, the lack of initials on the altered expiration date
strongly suggests to the Court that the date was modified after the
Mascaros signed this Listing Agreement and without their knowledge
or permission.

The Hansens' actions and the trail of documents

speak loudly and convincingly that the Mascaros signed the Listing
Agreements

only

because

of

Mr.

Hansen's

fraudulent

misrepresentations and false assurances concerning the duration and
scope of these agreements.

In reaching this determination, the

Court has given due consideration to all of the evidence, including
the Mascaros' confessed lack of expertise in real estate matters
and the particular facts surrounding Mr. Hansen's insistence that
they sign the Listing Agreements on a Sunday, when they did not
have access to their legal counsel.

The existence of these proven

facts in this case defeats Wardley's recovery upon the Listing
Agreements.

This Court concludes it would be inequitable, would be

00950

WARDLEY V. MASCARO

PAGE FIFTEEN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

unjust, and unlawful for this Court to enforce agreements, procured
through fraudulent inducement.
The Court notes that there are also other possible grounds on
which

the Mascaros

could

avoid

liability

Agreements, including the doctrine of mistake.

under

the

Listing

However, since the

Court finds that the Listing Agreements are voidable on the grounds
of

fraudulent

inducement,

the Court deems

it unnecessary to

consider alternative theories.
To summarize, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim
that the Mascaros breached the Listing Agreements.

Specifically,

the Court rules that the Listing Agreements are unenforceable.
Further, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim that Ms.
Cannon interfered with Wardley's economic relations with respect to
the Mascaros.

Since the Listing Agreements were unenforceable,

Wardley did not have viable economic relations with the Mascaros,
with which Ms. Cannon could interfere.
With respect to the Mascaros' Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint, the Court's ruling that the Listing Agreements are
unenforceable renders moot the Mascaros' claim that they are
entitled to attorney's fees and costs as specified within the terms
of the Listing Agreements.

In other words, in disaffirming the
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terms of the Listing Agreements, the Mascaros cannot seek to
selectively

reinstate

only

certain

portions

Agreements which are favorable to them.

of

the

Listing

The same concept applies

to the Mascaros' claim that Wardley breached the terms of the
Listing Agreements.

As

stated

previously,

since

fraudulent

inducement has been proven, the terms of the Listing Agreement are
not enforceable or binding on either the Mascaros or Wardley.

In

so ruling, the Court has essentially placed the Mascaros in the
same position that they were in before the Listing Agreements were
executed.
With respect to the Mascaros' claim for damages on fraud, it
is this Court's view that the Mascaros have been restored to their
former position by this Court's determination that the Listing
Agreements

are void.

Moreover, while the Mascaros may have

suffered emotional angst over the Hansens' conduct and whether
their property would be sold, there is no evidence that this
distress resulted in any compensatory damages. As a corollary, the
Mascaros have not presented any evidence that they have suffered a
pecuniary loss, particularly in light of their sale of the property
to Ms. Cannon under more beneficial terms than were offered by the
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Accordingly, the Court denies the Mascaros'

claim for damages.
Counsel for the Mascaros is to prepare an Order and Findings
consistent with, but not limited to the content of this Ruling
within fifteen (15) days.
Dated this (^/^^F^"f^^gust./^l 998.

k^

P(

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following,
this,

day of August, 1998:

Neil R. Sabin
J. Craig Smith
Annette F. Sorensen
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendants Mascaro
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
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Mark O* Morris
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,
Plaintiff,

COURT'S RULING
CASE NO. 940907000

vs,
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI
MASCARO and TRACEY CANNON,
Defendants.

LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,
Counterdefendant.

LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI
MASCARO,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES
HANSEN,
Third Party Defendants.
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The Court has before it a Notice to Submit, filed pursuant to
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with
defendants' Tracey Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc. (Cannon)
Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs and Request for Oral
Argument and defendants/counterclaimants/third-party plaintiffs'
Leland

J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro's

(Mascaros) Request for

Attorney Fees and Request for Oral Argument.

The Court having now

reviewed Cannons' and the Mascaros' Motions, Memoranda in support
and in opposition thereto, rules as stated herein.
At the outset, the Court notes that both Cannon and the
Mascaros have requested oral argument.

This request is denied.

The Court is not satisfied that there is a need or basis to justify
setting this matter for oral argument. Both sides have done a fine
job of stating their positions in the pleadings and the Court is
very conversant with the facts, law and arguments.
In their respective motions, Cannon and the Mascaros request
attorney's fees pursuant to .Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56. Section
78-27-56(1) provides that "[i]n civil actions, the court shall
award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith."

Under this

statute, attorney fees may be awarded only if the court determines
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that three requirements have been met: (1) the party seeking fees
prevailed; (2) the claim or defense asserted by the opposing party
was meritless; and (3) that claim or defense was asserted in bad
faith. With regard to each of these elements, the trial court must
make specific findings._J3££ Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808
P.2d 1061,

1068 (Utah 1991) ("Specific findings further the ends

of justice by allowing appeals courts to better review the trial
court's award.").
Both Cannon and the Mascaros assert that the Court should
grant them attorney's fees under § 78-27-56(1) because they are the
prevailing parties, and because Wardley's claims against them were
meritless and asserted in bad faith.

In support of this argument,

Cannon and the Mascaros rely on this Court's finding that thirdparty defendant Aries Hansen improperly modified
agreements with the Mascaros.

the listing

Cannon and the Mascaros argue that

Mr. Hansen's misconduct should be imputed to Wardley under the
theory of agency or respondeat superior and that Wardley is liable
to Cannon and the Mascaros for having to defend against Wardley's
meritless suit.
First, this Court does not agree that Wardley's suit was
"without merit". Specifically, Cannon and the Mascaros have failed
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to show that Wardley' s claims under the listing agreements were
"frivolous" or "of little weight or importance having no basis in
law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
While the Court subsequently determined that the listing agreements
entered into between Wardley and the Mascaros were voidable because
of Mr. Hansen's misconduct, the legality of the listing agreements,
a mixed fact and legal question, was not entirely clear.

The Court

reached its decision only after extensively evaluating the trial
testimony and carefully scrutinizing the numerous documents entered
into evidence, in light of the law.

Wardley has represented that

it did not have knowledge of Mr. Hansen's fraudulent activity and
strongly believed that it had a claim for unpaid commissions.
Wardley's decision to bring a lawsuit under the listing agreements,
which on their face appeared to be legitimate, cannot be viewed
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight and the benefit of approximately
four days of trial testimony.
Furthermore, the Court determines that Wardley's Complaint was
not asserted or pursued with the requisite bad faith.
671 P.2d at 151-52.

See

Cady,

"In order to find that a party "lacked good

faith," or in other words, acted in "bad faith," the trial court
must find that one or more of the following factors existed: (1)

on
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an honest belief

question;

(2)

the

in the propriety
party

intended

of the
to

take

unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the party intended to or
acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would
hinder, delay, or defraud others." Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158
(Utah Ct. App. 1997);
omitted).

See also Cady, 671 P.2d at 151 (citation

The record does not provide any credible support for a

finding that Wardley pursued its claims to hinder, delay, defraud,
or

otherwise

Mascaros.

As

take unconscionable
a result,

this

advantage

Court

cannot

of Cannon or the
find bad

faith.

Consequently, the Court determines that Cannon and the Mascaros do
not appear to be entitled to attorney's fees under §78-27-56.
Additionally, the totality of facts and circumstances don't point
to this as equitable.

Accordingly, Cannon's Motion and the

Mascaros' Request is denied.
Counsel for Wardley is to prepare an Order consistent with,
but not limited to, this Court's Ruling, and submit the same to the
Court for review and signature.
Finally, the Court seeks clarification as to whether Wardley
is still being represented by the law firm of Nielsen & Senior.
The Court has received a Notice to Submit filed by the law firm of
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Nielsen & Senior in connection with their Motion to Withdraw from
representing the Hansens.

While Nielsen & Senior is apparently

seeking to withdraw as counsel only for the Hansens, it now appears
that Wardley has retained the law firm of Scalley & Reading to
represent it in this matter.

The Court has received pleadings from

Scalley & Reading on behalf of Wardley.

(See Memorandum in

Opposition to Mascaro and Cannon's Motions for Attorney's Fees).
Until further clarification is received and an Order entered, this
Court will continue to consider Nielsen & Senior as counsel for
Wardley.

They are directed to contact the clients and Scalley &

Reading to clarify this issue.
Dated this

/

w

day of December, 19#8

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE , -.'," J"
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, postage prepaid, to the following, this
\Q

day of December, 1998:

Steven"B. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff Wardley
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Neil R. Sabin
J. Craig Smith
Annette F. Sorensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendants Mascaro
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark 0. Morris
Attorney for Defendant Cannon
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John R. Bucher
Attorney for Third Party Defendants Hansen
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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Steven B. Smith, #5797
SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS,

)
)

ORDER DENYING
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
v.
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO,
TRACEY CANNON and ASSOCIATES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

;
)
]

Civil No. 940907000 CN

])

Judge: Leslie A. Lewis

Defendants Tracey Cannon and Cannon and Associates ("Cannon") and
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro
("Mascaros"), after a trial in the above matter, petitioned the Court for an award of attorney's
fees from Plaintiff/Third Party Defendant, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley"),
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56. Memoranda in support and in opposition to
those Motions were filed and those Motions were submitted for decision. The Court having
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and being fully informed, now makes and enters the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both Cannons and Mascaros claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant

to Section 78-27-56 (1) contending that Wardley's claims were meritless and asserted in bad
faith.
2.

Wardley's claims, however, were not "without merit."

3.

Even though the listing agreements entered between Wardley and the

Mascaros were voidable because of the misconduct of Arlis Hansen, the legality of the listing
agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal questions which were not entirely clear.
There was no evidence presented that Wardley independently knew of Mr. Hansen's
fraudulent conduct, and there was evidence that Wardley strongly believed that it had a valid
claim for unpaid commissions. The evidence indicated: (a) Wardley had an honest belief in
the propriety of the activities in question; (b) Wardley did not intend to take unconscionable
advantage of others; and (c) Wardley did not intend to or act with knowledge that its
activities would hinder, delay, and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Cannon and Mascaros failed to demonstrate that Wardley's claims were

"frivolous," or "of little weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact" as set forth in
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
2.

Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith.

3.

The totality of facts and circumstances would make it inequitable to

force Wardley to pay Cannons' and Mascaros' attorney's fees.

2
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DATED this C 7

dav of March? 1999.
By the Court:

Judge Leslie Lewis

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the .
day of March, 1999, a true and correct copy of
Wardley's Order Denying Attorney's Fees was deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
James C. Haskins, Esq.
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mark O. Morris, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
John Bucher, Esq.
1343 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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